

NOTE TO D/DCI/IC

Here is a draft of a "nice" (though, I hope, fairly clear and direct) letter to General Tighe for the DCI's signature; it responds to General Tighe's letter of 20 April concerning the national sitrep. I have done my best to discourage any further communications from General Tighe on this issue.

For your information: [REDACTED] has learned that General Faurer was disappointed by Tighe's letter to the DCI. Indeed, Faurer rewrote Tighe's initial letter, toning it down and putting it in terms of a suggestion rather than a tacit demand. Even so, Tighe all but accuses the DCI of seeking to "stifle" the flow of intelligence. Also, he misapprehends the nature of the problem: Bush didn't volunteer a single sitrep, he was told simply to make sure that it was produced. (so that high-level readers were not burdened with departmental and agency products which were mostly redundant but which sometimes differed with one another for reasons not explained).

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Attachments:

Draft ltr to General Tighe
w/background material

Revised 4-1

Cross Ref: Prod. To 11


9 Apr

DCI

*Recommend signature.
this is a fine step
in the right direction.
[redacted] run this
to ground.*


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



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*How do MIO's
hook into SITREP's??
Let's discuss*



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ER 76-1857

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

12 APR 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

FROM: George Bush

SUBJECT: The Production of a National Situation
Report by the Intelligence Community

1. The Intelligence Community is now prepared to produce for senior consumers a national intelligence situation report (sitrep) during crises. Under my auspices, the principal producing agencies (CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA) will, when international events and the needs of the NSC and its staff so demand, cooperate in the preparation of an all-source national intelligence sitrep which will reflect Community views and clarify any important Community disagreements over substance.

2. I will assume responsibility within the Community for deciding when and by whom a national sitrep should be produced. I would expect, normally, to designate one Community component to act as my executive agent and assume primary responsibility for producing the sitrep, and, more often than not, I would expect CIA to serve in that capacity. There will be times, however, when the nature of a particular crisis--the Mayaguez incident comes to mind--may prompt me to name some other agency, such as DIA.

3. In any event, the major producing agencies will offer various forms of assistance to the task force assembled by the executive agent, each according to its special capabilities. Such assistance would include: the provision of analysts, preferably collocated with the task force, to act as intermediaries; the submission of written contributions to the publication itself; and the extension of special support in the area of collection tasking and response.

4. At the same time, we in the Community agree that the producing elements must continue to issue crisis intelligence

(including "departmental" sitreps) in the manner appropriate to their functions. . But we also agree that these elements would be expected--in the absence of specific requests to the contrary--to withhold dissemination of sitrep-type intelligence publications to readers in the White House and the NSC Staff. The needs of these consumers for frequent, up-to-date intelligence reporting and interpretation would, we believe, be satisfied by the national product.

5. The coordination of the national sitrep will pose some problems. We will encourage as much coordination as practicable, and when there are important substantive disagreements, these will be clearly expressed in the sitrep. But the task force will have to meet pressing deadlines and often will not be able to delay publication for the sake of extensive coordination.

25X1A 6. [REDACTED] is currently overseeing a Community effort to ensure that the national sitrep will be informed by all information bearing on the problem at hand, including relevant information which receives only extremely limited dissemination and information concerning US diplomatic initiatives and military moves. At the same time, his staff, together with the producing agencies, is formulating precise procedures for the production of the national sitrep. [REDACTED] assures me that all have approached this endeavor in a spirit of wholehearted cooperation. And I assure you that we are now ready to meet your request for national intelligence support during crises.

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SIGNED

George Bush

Distribution:

0 - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DDCL

1 - ER

1 - ex member of ad hoc Community group
on national sitrep

1 - IC/PAID Subject & chrono

1 - IC/Registry

IC/PAID [REDACTED] 4445/9 Apr 76


CONFIDENTIAL

765 76-4183

Revised 7-1

Cross Ref. Production 7
d. Production 11

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

6 April 76

TO: Chief, PAID

SUBJECT: NSC Requirement

SECRET

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BACKGROUND

[REDACTED] NIO/ME, alerted me concerning a matter raised today by the NSC Contingency Planning Group (chaired by Hyland) concerning the plethora of reports received in the past at the White House during periods of crisis. The current concern is related to the volatile situation in Lebanon and, should war break out, the management of intelligence reporting in order to preclude a heavy volume of raw, duplicative, and often conflicting reports deluging the White House.

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PROBLEM

In essence, the problem is that of streamlining the intelligence reporting system such that exactly ONE (1) SITREP, representing the best judgments of the Intelligence Community, is provided to the senior policy/decision makers.

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REQUIREMENT


On Monday, 12 April, [REDACTED] will attend another meeting of the NSC Contingency Planning Group at which time he has been charged with reporting on what efforts are being made to develop an effective, streamlined intelligence reporting system for crisis situations. [REDACTED] has asked for IC Staff assistance in this, particularly since such a system would have world-wide application, not just Middle East. This request will be confirmed by memo.

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SECRET

INFORMATION



sitrep task force

Mr. Baraz/Ms. Wahl--State

—MG Faurer--DIA

Mr.

—Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

Mr.

—Mr.

Col.

Mr.

Dr.

Mr.

25X1A

Chairman

28 APR 1978

Approved For Release 2002/01/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070008-0

4	D/DCI/IC	W.S.	OPP		OPEI	
3	EA	PJN 4/30	P&PD		INTEG STAFF	
2	AD/DCI/IC	DET 4/28	IHD		SIGINT DIV.	
1	EO	W 4/28	SECOM		IMAGERY DIV.	
	SA [REDACTED]		OPBD		HRD	25X1A
	SA [REDACTED]		DSG		PA&ID	
	CFI/USIB		P&BDD			
	REGISTRY		PAD			

Cy furn those circled

1-2 For review *Good letter - JES*

1-4 For approval

National Sitrep letter reply to Tische

The Church Committee made much of the large amount of raw intelligence flowing into the White House. That's another point that we can make if you see a need to.

[REDACTED] This letter (in draft) looks fine. Recommend approval

RECEIVED
APR 28 4 59 PM '78

[REDACTED] Made several modifications in the letter which should be ready for your chop.
Dek, Ready to go smooth.

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